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It has been argued that the international community is moving ‘beyond aid’. International co-financing in the
international collective interest is expected to replace altruistically motivated foreign aid. The World Health
Organization promotes ‘universal health coverage’ as the overarching health goal for the next phase of the
Millennium Development Goals. In order to provide a basic level of health care coverage, at least some countries
will need foreign aid for decades to come. If international co-financing of global public goods is replacing foreign
aid, is universal health coverage a hopeless endeavor? Or would universal health coverage somehow serve the
international collective interest?
Using the Sustainable Development Solutions Network proposal to finance universal health coverage as a test case,
we examined the hypothesis that national social policies face the threat of a ‘race to the bottom’ due to global
economic integration and that this threat could be mitigated through international social protection policies that
include international cross-subsidies – a kind of ‘equalization’ at the international level.
The evidence for the race to the bottom theory is inconclusive. We seem to be witnessing a ‘convergence to the
middle’. However, the ‘middle’ where ‘convergence’ of national social policies is likely to occur may not be high
enough to keep income inequality in check.
The implementation of the international equalization scheme proposed by the Sustainable Development Solutions
Network would allow to ensure universal health coverage at a cost of US$55 in low income countries-the minimum
cost estimated by the World Health Organization. The domestic efforts expected from low and middle countries are
far more substantial than the international co-financing efforts expected from high income countries. This would
contribute to ‘convergence’ of national social policies at a higher level. We therefore submit that the proposed
international equalization scheme should not be considered as foreign aid, but rather as an international collective
effort to protect and promote national social policy in times of global economic integration: thus serving the
international collective interest.
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According to Riddell, the principle that underpins for-
eign aid is simple: “Those who can should help those
who are in extreme need” [1]. But Severino and Ray pre-
dict the end of foreign aid as we know it: the death of
official development assistance (ODA) and its rebirth as
global policy financing (GPF) [2]. Sumner and Mallet
argue that the future of foreign aid, or ‘Aid 2.0’, will be
characterized by co-financing global public goods-and
fighting poverty as a global public bad [3]. Glennie pro-
poses ‘international public financing’ instead of foreign
aid, and argues that international public financing “should
not only be seen as support to other countries, but to the
global commons” [4]. With regards to global health, Kaul
and Gleicher argue that “[a]s the institution of the state
has no full equivalent internationally, international co-
operation has to happen voluntarily; and as past experi-
ence has shown, voluntary cooperation is more likely
to happen when it makes sense for all, that is, if it is
based on a clear and fair win-win agreement” [5]. For
Kickbusch, “the best is yet to come” for global health, if
it “strengthens its political ability to produce global
public goods for health” [6]. What all these forecasts
have in common is an expectation that ‘helping those
who need help’ will no longer be the main engine of
foreign aid; the international collective interest will
drive international co-financing.
Meanwhile, the World Health Organization (WHO)
proposes ‘universal health coverage’ (UHC) as a “single
overarching health goal” for the next iteration of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) [7], but ac-
knowledges that “[i]n lower-income countries, where
prepayment structures may be underdeveloped or ineffi-
cient and where health needs are massive, there are
many obstacles to raising sufficient funds through pre-
payment and pooling”, and that “[i]t is essential, there-
fore, that international donors lend their support” [8].
But why would ‘donors’-a misnomer when it comes to
co-financing out of collective interest – co-finance UHC
in low income countries? The international collective
interest of infectious disease control is rather obvious,
but it is not self-evident how ensuring “that people have
access to all the services they need including those relat-
ing to [non-communicable diseases], mental health, in-
fectious diseases, reproductive health etc.” [7], would
serve the international collective interest. The ‘Meeting
Global Challenges’ report of the International Task Force
on Global Public Goods mentions “preventing the emer-
gence and spread of infectious disease” as a “priority glo-
bal public good”; it does not mention ‘improving global
health’ or ‘reducing global health inequalities’ as a prior-
ity global public good [9].
The proposal by the Sustainable Development Solu-
tions Network (SDSN) on health in the post-2015development agenda expects high income countries to
mobilize and allocate the equivalent of 0.1% of their
gross domestic product (GDP) to international assist-
ance for health [10]. All countries are expected to “make
progress to allocating at least 5% of national GDP as
public financing for health (with low- and middle-
income countries reducing by at least half the gap
between 5% of GDP and current public funding)”, do-
mestically[a] [10]. This proposal may come across as yet
another foreign aid proposal – coming with domestic fi-
nancing conditions or expectations – but we contend
that it has the characteristics of a (modest) international
‘equalization’ scheme that could serve the collective
international interest. (Our examination uses the SDSN
figures for illustrative purposes, but this does not mean
we support all the proposed levels of allocation of GDP
to public financing for health).
Equalization is a word used to describe mechanisms that
are common to most federal countries and that are de-
signed to ensure that sub-national jurisdictions (like the
provinces of Canada or the ‘länder’ of Germany) can – in
spite of their fiscal autonomy and differences in economic
activity – provide comparable levels of public services
[11]. The Canadian Constitution Act, for example, im-
poses equalization “to ensure that provincial governments
have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of
taxation” [12].
The SDSN proposal is somewhat similar to an
equalization scheme, in that it expects comparable levels
of government revenue raising from all countries (in-
stead of provinces), and it would ensure that all coun-
tries can provide at least basic levels of public health
services. The SDSN proposal would not allow all countries
to provide comparable levels of public health services, at
least not in the short term. Over time, if GDP per capita
levels would converge, and if cross-subsidies between
countries would increase, an international equalization
scheme would allow all countries to provide comparable
levels of public health services.
Would an international equalization scheme be pos-
sible, without an international government? According
to Holst, The European Social Fund and the European
Cohesion Fund can be seen as equalization schemes,
while the European Commission, which manages these
funds, is not a government [13]. Nonetheless, we do not
have at the global level an international organization
with the powers of the European Commission. But the
purpose of this paper is not to explore how an inter-
national equalization scheme for universal health cover-
age could be organized; the purpose is to explore one of
the arguments for such a scheme – an argument that
has received limited attention in the context of inter-
national aid.
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international equalization scheme that – at least in the
short term – will only cost them financial contributions?
Where is the “clear and fair win–win agreement” that
Kaul and Gleicher are looking for [5]; where is Kickbusch’s
global public good for health [6]? The SDSN emphasizes
an expected ‘externality’ of UHC that highlights its global
public good value, namely economic growth [9]. Other
externalities of UHC have been suggested and examined
for their global public good value elsewhere: infectious
disease control, demographic control (encouraging the
‘demographic transition’ through improved health care),
increasing security and decreasing pressure for migration
[14]. They may all be valid and contribute to the political
feasibility of the international equalization scheme pro-
posed by the SDSN. In this paper, however, we want to ex-
plore a different externality, namely the impact that an
international equalization scheme could have on the so-
called ‘race to the bottom’.
For this purpose, we explore the double hypothesis
that national social policies “face the threat of a ‘race to
the bottom’” due to global economic integration, and
that this threat can be reversed or mitigated through
international social policies [15]. The global equalization
scheme as proposed would be, if accepted, an inter-
national social policy. If all countries agreed to observe
the minimum levels of domestic public health financing
proposed by the SDSN, many would have to adapt tax-
ation levels accordingly, and that could mitigate the
downward pressure on taxation and social policy levels
caused by the quest for competitiveness in a globalized
market – or so we will examine.
To be clear, we consider the global equalization
scheme proposed by the SDSN first and foremost as a
practical implementation of the shared national and
international responsibility enshrined in the human right
to health [16], and we would support it even if it had no
global public good value. But we contend that it would
serve the international collective interest, and it should
be considered and examined as an international collect-
ive effort to protect and promote national social policies,
rather than as a new foreign aid proposal.
Discussion
An international equalization scheme for universal health
coverage: implications for low, middle and high income
countries
The SDSN proposes that all countries “make progress to
allocating at least 5% of national GDP as public finan-
cing for health (with low- and middle-income countries
reducing by at least half the gap between 5% of GDP
and current public funding)”, domestically [10].
To understand the financial implications of this pro-
posal, we need to compare the proposed domestic publicfinancing levels with the present domestic public finan-
cing levels. The WHO World Health Statistics 2013 re-
port provides us with estimates of average total health
expenditure as percentage of GDP in different income
groups of countries, and with estimates of average gov-
ernment expenditure on health as percentage of total
health expenditure, both for 2000 and 2010 [17]. For low
income countries in particular, there is an additional cor-
rection to be made to examine domestic public financing
levels: external resources for health are reported as per-
centage of total health expenditure; thus we cannot de-
termine how much international assistance is included
in government expenditure and how much international
assistance is included in private health expenditure.
Table 1 is based on the assumption that international as-
sistance is proportionally allocated to government and
private expenditure, and that means that low income
countries were allocating, in 2010, the equivalent of 1.5%
of GDP to domestic public financing for health.
This table shows that the SDSN proposal is very de-
manding for low income and lower middle income
countries: they are expected to increase government ex-
penditure on health from domestic resources from 1.5%
of GDP to 3.25% of GP (to halve the gap between 1.5%
and 5% of GDP). Upper middle income countries are
expected to make additional efforts as well, while high
income countries have, on average at least, already reached
their target.
But low income countries – and some lower middle in-
come countries – would also benefit from international
transfers under the proposed international equalization
scheme. To calculate how much they would benefit, we
developed a spreadsheet based on data for 2011 from the
Global Health Observatory of the WHO [18], and as-
sumed that the equivalent of 0.1% of GDP that high in-
come countries are expected to contribute to international
co-financing would be distributed in accordance with
needs: the poorest countries would come first. First we as-
sumed that all countries that are not yet allocating the
equivalent of 5% of GDP to government expenditure on
health would indeed halve the gap between their present
spending level and 5% of GDP, than we distributed US$45
billion – the equivalent of 0.1% of GDP of the ‘advanced
economies’, according to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) [19] – starting from the poorest countries. Table 2
shows the results.
All low income and some lower middle income coun-
tries would receive international co-financing for UHC;
the combination of increased domestic efforts and inter-
national co-financing would allow them to spend about
$55 per person per year on UHC. All countries not men-
tioned in Table 2 would be able to spend the same amount
or more, from domestic resources only. Would that
be sufficient? The Taskforce on Innovative International
Table 1 Health expenditure in low, middle and high income countries (data for 2010)
Income group Total expenditure on health
as percentage of GDP
General government
expenditure on health
as percentage of total
expenditure on health
General government
expenditure on health
as percentage of GDP
External resources for
health as percentage
of total expenditure
on health
General government
expenditure on health
form domestic resources,
as percentage of GDP
General government
expenditure on health
as percentage of GDP,
SDSN proposal
Low income 5.3 38.5 2.0 26.3 1.5 3.25
Lower middle income 4.3 36.1 1.6 2.5 1.5 3.25
Upper middle income 6.0 55.5 3.3 0.3 3.3 4.15
High income 12.4 61.8 7.7 1.1 7.6 5.00
Source: World Health Organization, World Health Statistics 2013.
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Table 2 Distribution of equalization transfers (data for 2011)
Country Present per capita
government expenditure
on health at average
exchange rate (US$)
General government
expenditure on health
as percentage of GDP
after reduction of
external resources
Minimum domestic
general government
expenditure on health
as percentage of GDP,
SDSN proposal
Minimum domestic per
capita government
expenditure on health,
SDSN proposal, at
average exchange
rate (US$)
Gap between minimum
domestic per capita
expenditure and US$55
Population (in
thousands of
people)
Equalization transfers
required (in thousands
of US$)
India 18.32 1.19 3.09 47.24 7.76 1,220,000 9,463,809.96
Bangladesh 9.71 1.27 3.14 22.37 32.63 153,000 4,991,904.92
Ethiopia 9.59 1.49 3.25 11.60 43.40 89,393 3,879,572.30
Pakistan 8.02 0.64 2.82 33.37 21.63 176,000 3,806,852.47
Democratic Republic
of the Congo
6.66 1.98 3.49 8.06 46.94 63,932 3,001,283.16
United Republic of
Tanzania
14.75 1.69 3.35 17.15 37.85 46,355 1,754,549.09
Uganda 11.15 1.81 3.41 15.29 39.71 35,148 1,395,846.96
Myanmar 2.92 0.26 2.63 29.62 25.38 52,351 1,328,480.95
Kenya 14.34 1.09 3.04 24.57 30.43 42,028 1,278,957.14
Afghanistan 8.72 1.25 3.12 18.24 36.76 29,105 1,069,823.02
Mozambique 14.70 0.83 2.92 15.59 39.41 24,581 968,847.64
Nepal 12.98 1.83 3.41 20.72 34.28 27,156 931,027.03
Madagascar 11.98 2.11 3.56 16.59 38.41 21,679 832,587.08
Niger 11.09 2.11 3.56 13.44 41.56 16,511 686,172.11
Malawi 22.71 2.93 3.96 14.63 40.37 15,458 624,066.51
Nigeria 29.19 1.85 3.42 51.20 3.80 164,000 623,569.96
Burkina Faso 18.70 1.92 3.46 19.78 35.22 15,995 563,322.38
Mali 20.25 2.29 3.64 23.85 31.15 14,417 449,024.64
Burundi 7.63 1.51 3.26 8.72 46.28 9,540 441,493.12
Guinea 8.13 1.43 3.21 16.03 38.97 11,162 434,953.54
Cambodia 11.50 1.08 3.04 27.35 27.65 14,606 403,917.74
Sudan 29.40 2.27 3.64 44.89 10.11 36,431 368,314.98
Chad 9.55 0.99 2.99 24.62 30.38 12,080 366,939.02
Rwanda 35.58 3.28 4.14 24.13 30.87 11,144 344,008.31
Côte d’Ivoire 21.14 1.60 3.30 38.68 16.32 19,390 316,452.49
Haiti 25.20 2.45 3.72 27.01 27.99 10,033 280,808.39
Benin 19.55 1.59 3.30 26.47 28.53 9,780 279,012.07
Cameroon 21.23 1.56 3.28 42.78 12.22 21,156 258,549.98
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Table 2 Distribution of equalization transfers (data for 2011) (Continued)
Sierra Leone 12.34 2.72 3.86 14.04 40.96 5,865 240,231.21
Eritrea 6.78 0.39 2.69 14.62 40.38 5,933 239,554.77
Togo 23.45 3.46 4.23 23.70 31.30 6,472 202,574.69
Tajikistan 15.99 1.46 3.23 30.24 24.76 7,815 193,501.05
Liberia 17.34 2.62 3.81 10.74 44.26 4,080 180,582.19
Central African
Republic
9.49 1.27 3.14 15.12 39.88 4,436 176,923.50
Viet Nam 38.25 2.66 3.83 53.33 1.67 89,914 150,470.00
Senegal 39.05 3.00 4.00 44.78 10.22 13,331 136,176.99
Yemen 18.45 1.09 3.05 49.27 5.73 23,304 133,454.66
Lao People’s
Democratic Republic
18.11 1.04 3.02 40.09 14.91 6,521 97,238.62
Gambia 14.82 1.25 3.12 19.52 35.48 1,735 61,566.39
Guinea-Bissau 9.97 0.92 2.96 17.53 37.47 1,624 60,854.17
Kyrgyzstan 42.52 3.46 4.23 46.44 8.56 5,403 46,269.47
Mauritania 34.95 3.01 4.00 42.87 12.13 3,703 44,920.14
Timor-Leste 33.11 1.78 3.39 30.99 24.01 1,096 26,316.01
Comoros 24.60 1.81 3.40 27.53 27.47 700 19,227.96
Zambia 52.15 2.66 3.83 54.61 0.39 13,634 5,319.01
South Sudan 13.46 0.55 2.78 54.63 0.37 10,381 3,846.39
Sao Tome and
Principe
39.02 1.92 3.46 52.55 2.45 183 448.22
43,163,622.42
Source: World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory data repository (consulted April 2014), SDSN proposal.
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Figure 2 Present and expected public financing of UHC in
Bangladesh and India, per person per year.
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come countries, the costs of achieving the current health
sector MDGs would be about $50-55 per person per year
[20].
Table 1 already illustrated that the effort expected
from low and middle income countries is – in percent-
age of GDP – far more substantial than the effort ex-
pected from high income countries. According to our
estimates, all low and middle income countries together
are expected to increase general government expend-
iture by about $267 billion, or six times more than the
effort expected from high income countries.
Figure 1 illustrates the additional domestic effort ex-
pected from Uganda and Kenya, two low income neighbor-
ing countries in Africa. Figure 2 illustrates the additional
domestic effort expected from Bangladesh and India, two
neighboring countries in Asia. Figure 3 illustrates the
additional domestic effort expected from Argentina and
Brazil, two upper middle income neighboring countries
in Latin America.
We used three pairs of neighboring countries with
comparable levels of economic development because of
the race to the bottom theory, which we will examine in
the next section.
‘Race to the bottom’, true or false?
In 1997, Rodrik warned against “social disintegration as
the price of economic integration” [21]. One conse-
quence of global economic integration is that some fac-
tors of the economy, like highly skilled workers and
capital, can easily move from countries where they (or
their owners) consider the tax burden as detrimental to
their profits, to produce similar goods and services in
countries where taxation is lower, and to sell these prod-
ucts in the markets of the countries they moved out
from. Companies based in countries with a (relatively)
higher tax burden are forced to compete with those in
countries with a lower tax burden, which find it easier toFigure 1 Present and expected public financing of UHC in
Kenya and Uganda, per person per year.attract investment and highly skilled workers. Govern-
ments of countries with higher tax burdens are there-
fore encouraged to reduce taxation levels, at times at
the expense of national social policy. Conversely, gov-
ernments wishing to enhance their national social pol-
icies may not be doing so, out of fear of becoming less
attractive for investment. As Manmohan Singh, then Fi-
nance Minister and now Prime Minister of India, ex-
plained to Friedman: “In a world in which capital isFigure 3 Present and expected public financing of UHC in
Argentina and Brazil, per person per year.
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ation that are far from the rates that prevail in other
countries and when labor is mobile you also can’t be
out of line with others’ wages” [22].
What is the evidence for this ‘race to the bottom’? The
World Economic Outlook dataset of the IMF provides
information about general government revenue in aggre-
gated groups of countries [19]. As Figure 4 illustrates,
the average general government revenue in ‘advanced
economies’ (corresponding with the World Bank’s high
income economies) seems to decrease very slowly – not
a ‘race’ at all – from 35.9% of GDP in 2001 to 35.6% of
GDP in 2012: that is a decrease of 0.3% of GDP. That
seems may seem negligible, but it is three times the vol-
ume of international co-financing of UHC expected by
the SDSN. The seven biggest economies or ‘G7’ followed
the same path at a similar pace: government revenue de-
creased from 35.5% of GDP in 2001 to 35% in 2012, a
decrease of 0.5% of GDP. But the average general gov-
ernment revenue of ‘emerging market and developing
economies’ (corresponding with the World Bank’s low
and middle income economies) increased from 23.7% of
GDP in 2001 to 28.3% of GDP in 2012. Rather than a
race to the bottom, we seem to witness ‘convergence to-
wards the top’.
A closer look at the same dataset – zooming in on the
G7 countries – tells a more nuanced story. In France,
Italy, and Japan, government revenue increased substan-
tially. In Germany and the UK, it remained more or less
stable, but in Canada, and the USA, government revenue
decreased substantially. In the USA, representing almost
half of the GDP of all G7 countries combined, government
revenue decreased from 32.1% of GDP in 2001 to 29% of
GDP in 2012: that is a decrease of 3% of GDP. In Canada,
the ‘loss’ was even worse: from 45.1% of GDP in 2001 to
41.5% of GDP in 2012, or a 3.6% of GDP decrease.
As it appears, countries with a government revenue
level hovering around 50% of GDP (e.g., France) are able
to ‘coexist’ within a relatively open trade relationship
with countries with a much lower government revenue
level hovering around 30% of GDP (e.g., Japan), withoutFigure 4 Recent evolution of general government revenue in
aggregated groups of countries.facing a massive exodus of investment. Ambitious social
policy can also improve competitiveness. Intergenera-
tional social mobility – or “the extent to which individ-
uals move up (or down) the social ladder compared with
their parents” – is influenced by many factors, some of
which are “heavily affected” by social policy, including
“policies that shape access to human capital formation,
such as public support for early childhood, primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary education, as well as redistributive
policies (e.g. tax and transfer schemes) that may reduce
or raise financial and other barriers to accessing higher
education” [23]. In other words, higher levels of taxation
can allow for social policies that encourage intergenera-
tional social mobility. Intergenerational social mobility
indicates that more people succeed in developing and
using their talents, and therefore one can intuitively
expect that in countries with relatively high intergener-
ational social mobility, in part due to relatively high
tax revenue and social policy, the average productivity
would be relative high too. That could explain how
countries with a government revenue level hovering
around 50% of GDP are able to coexist within a relatively
open trade relationship with countries with a much lower
government revenue level. So, the premise on which the
race to the bottom theory is built seems incomplete.
However, at least at some times, some governments
decided to cut back on social policy with the intention
of increasing the global competitiveness of the compan-
ies based in their countries. For example, in the early
1990s, John Major, then Prime Minister of the UK, ad-
mitted to “having created a paradise for foreign inves-
tors”, saying: “Europe can have the social charter. We
shall have employment” [24].
According to Boix, there are two very different stories
about the historical relationship between global economic
integration and national social policy. One is based on the
race to the bottom theory, already discussed above: “Ac-
cording to this position, the advanced world will end up
adjusting its welfare state downward, forced by the com-
petition of emerging economies” [25]. In the other story,
“equally possible and empirically more compelling”, or so
argues Boix, globalization promotes growth in all open
economies, and “as soon as each economy reaches a cer-
tain level of prosperity, it expands political rights and de-
mocratizes”, which “in turn, leads to the creation of a
social insurance system” [25]. But he concedes that be-
cause of global economic integration, “more mature
economies may have to implement some policy adjust-
ments in the short and medium run” [25], and men-
tions the UK and the USA as examples of countries
with “quite flexible labour markets that adjust readily
to world prices”, which “has resulted, so far, in lower
levels of structural unemployment yet higher levels of
income inequality”, while “long-term unemployment,
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benefits, has rocketed in Europe, especially in those
countries in its periphery (such as the Mediterranean
basin), which combine weakly competitive industries
and very generous welfare systems” [25]. Read in con-
junction with Figures 4 and 5, Boix’ comments seem to
confirm the argument that there has been a downward
erosion, if not a race to the bottom, at least in high in-
come countries.
Still according to Boix, the proponents of the race to
the bottom theory are “split into two political camps”:
the ‘protectionists’, who “would rather stop or even undo
the process of international integration”, and the ‘feder-
alists’, “by now mostly limited to parts of the academic
world and some policy elites”, who “defend the construc-
tion of global political institutions to unify national regu-
lations (such as labour or environmental standards) in
order to counter the effects of excessive capital mobility
and inter-state competition” [25]. Based on our support
for the SDSN proposal, Boix would probably count us
among the ‘federalists’.
But one does not have to be a firm believer in the race
to the bottom theory, to argue for international social
protection standards. Even if one agrees with Boix, one
can still consider that it may be a smart economic op-
tion for high income countries to ‘invest’ in international
social policy standards, to allow the ‘temporary adjust-
ments’ to be shorter and less invasive, and to promote
the transition towards higher social protection levels
elsewhere. Even if global economic integration were in-
deed leading to convergence towards the top in the long
term, it may be possible and wise to invest in the accel-
eration of that process.
Furthermore, even if government revenue in low and
middle income countries seems to increase faster thanFigure 5 Recent evolution of general government revenue in
G7 countries.the coinciding decrease in high income countries, it may
not increase fast enough to mitigate income inequality.
According to Milanovic, international income inequality
is declining, if measured by comparing average income
of countries, weighted for population size [26]. But if
measured by comparing household income across bor-
ders, the data do “not show any clear trend over the
period 1988–2005 for which we have detailed household
survey data” [26]. The explanation is that while average
income inequality between countries decreases, income
inequality within countries increases. Firebaugh comes
to similar conclusions and warns that “the transfer of in-
equality from across nations to within nations is likely to
create new problems or exacerbate old ones within na-
tion”, and that “[g]rowing income inequality within na-
tions might raise the specter of growing civil unrest and
terrorism by nonstate actors at the very time that the ef-
fectiveness of national governments is weakened by
transnational structures” [27]. If we want declining in-
come inequality between countries to lead to declining
income inequality between people, social policy levels in
low and middle income countries would have to increase
faster than they currently are, while social policy levels
in high income countries would have to be stopped from
further declining.
An international equalization scheme for UHC: feasible or
wishful thinking?
As discussed above, the international equalization scheme
proposed by the SDSN comes with substantial incentives
for low income countries like Uganda and Kenya. Uganda
would be expected to double its domestic effort – from
$8 to $15 per person per year – and Kenya would be
expected to almost triple its domestic effort – from $9
to $24 per person per year. But Uganda would receive
$40 per person per year from the equalization scheme,
while Kenya would receive $31 per person per year
from the scheme.
There would be an additional benefit for both Kenya
and Uganda. The Government of Kenya may be reluc-
tant to increase government revenue, out of fear that in-
vestments will move to neighboring Uganda, for example.
And the Government of Uganda may be reluctant to in-
crease government revenue, for exactly the same reason.
According to the Tax Justice Network Africa and Actio-
nAid, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda already are
involved in a regional tax competition [28]. If all these
countries progress together at a similar pace, none of
them would benefit, and none of them would have to fear
that their neighbor would benefit to their detriment.
Neither Argentina nor Brazil would receive international
cross-subsidies under the international equalization
scheme. But Argentina would benefit from Brazil being
expected to increase government revenue, while the
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so – considering expectations from constituencies in
Brazil – if it were assured that the Government of
Argentina would not use the opportunity to lower its gov-
ernment revenue for the sake of luring away investment.
The real challenge seems to be a problem of ‘free rid-
ing behavior’. We can consider the problem of maintain-
ing or increasing competitiveness at the expense of
social policy – either decreasing social policy, or not in-
creasing social policy to levels desired by most people –
as ‘a tragedy of the commons’. The commons, or ‘com-
mon pool resource’ (CPR), is ‘global potential govern-
ment revenue’. Governments that reduce taxation levels
or delay the increase of taxation levels are obviously not
trying to get rid of government revenue, they are trying
to attract potential government revenue – taxable eco-
nomic activity – from elsewhere, or trying to prevent it
from fleeing. Even if we consider the present evolution
of government revenue as a convergence rather than a
race to the bottom, there probably is a loss of global po-
tential government revenue due to governments holding
each other back. That means that the international com-
munity needs a ‘collective choice arrangement’ [29];
countries need to agree on what reasonably comparable
levels of taxation and social policy are, which is exactly
what the SDNS proposal is proposing (if only for health
care). It would only work if all countries participate:
Argentina and Brazil need to be sure that Uruguay and
Paraguay join the collective choice arrangement, Kenya
and Uganda need to be sure that Rwanda and Tanzania
join, and so on. But some countries are likely to opt for
free riding: every country would benefit from a collective
effort of increasing government revenue and social
(health) policy, but an individual country could benefit
even more from adopting a slightly lower level than the
agreed level, thus enjoying the benefits of somewhat
higher social policy and improved competitiveness.
Let us assume for a while that many countries are in-
terested to join the collective choice arrangement, but
some are not – and cannot be forced. Can we solve that?
Rodrik, a ‘protectionist’ and a ‘federalist’ at the same
time, proposes “two different paths, one appropriate for
the short to medium term, and the other for the long
term” [30], to reduce the downward pressure from glo-
bal economic integration on national social policy. His
path for the short to medium term is one of reversing
global economic integration: countries would be allowed
to opt out of international trade agreements and present
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, if that is re-
quired to protect their social policies. His path for the
long term is “global federalism”, in which “politics and
jurisdictions expand to match the scope of a truly inte-
grated global economy” [30]. We would argue that his
proposal can be used to stimulate convergence towardsthe top as much as for avoiding downwards erosion, and
that the chronology proposed by Rodrik can be reversed
– advancing global social integration first, reversing glo-
bal economic integration second (if still needed).
Allow us to imagine, for the sake of the exercise, that
the United Nations General Assembly does not embrace
the SDSN proposal, but that the countries of the
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and European
Union (EU) partnership do. That partnership was created
with the first Lomé Convention of 1975, and it has a Joint
Parliamentary Assembly that unites representatives of 78
ACP and 28 EU countries. About 1.4 billion people live in
one of these 106 countries – 20% of the world’s popula-
tion, 50% of the world’s countries. The Joint Parliamentary
Assembly has a standing committee on social and envir-
onmental affairs, where the SDSN proposal could be dis-
cussed and adapted. If we apply the thresholds for
domestic efforts and international transfers proposed by
the SDSN to the countries of the ACP-EU partnership
(excluding all other countries), we find that they could
aim together for a minimum level of UHC at almost $50
per person per year in all countries of the partnership.
The ‘advanced economies’ of the EU would, together, con-
tribute to equalization transfers at 0.1% of GDP: $16.8 bil-
lion per year, as Table 3 illustrates.
On the distribution side, several beneficiaries would ‘dis-
appear’ because they are not ACP members, thus reducing
the need substantially. Even so, $55 per person per year
would not be possible, but $50 would, almost – it would
require $17 billion per year, as Table 4 illustrates.
If the 106 countries of the ACP-EU partnership were
to agree on an ACP-EU equalization scheme for health,
along the lines of the SDSN proposal, they would have
enough influence within the WTO to negotiate less pref-
erential treatment for non-adhering countries. This pre-
supposes, however, that WTO members that are not ACP-
EU countries are also allowed to adhere – they would have
the choice between adhering and enjoying preferential
trade status, or not adhering and not enjoying the pref-
erential trade status. Thus global economic integration
would be reversed, but only for countries rejecting the
collective choice arrangement. The collective choice ar-
rangement would not be imposed upon sovereign states,
but it would come with an additional benefit. If such a so-
lution can be found for international standards of intellec-
tual property protection – the WTO Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) –
why not for international standards of social policy?
Obviously, more research is needed to be able to pre-
dict the potential impact of the SDSN proposal on na-
tional social policy, government revenue, investment and
trade, but we submit – for further debate and research –
that the proposed international equalization scheme
should not be considered as a foreign aid proposal, but
Table 3 Contributions to equalization transfers ACP-EU
(data for 2011)
Country GDP, current
prices, in billions
of US$, 2011
Contributions
to equalization
(in thousands
of US$)
Percentage
of GDP of all
‘advanced
economies’
of the EU
Germany 3,631 3,631,435 21.76
France 2,785 2,784,761 16.68
United Kingdom 2,465 2,464,639 14.77
Italy 2,198 2,198,350 13.17
Spain 1,456 1,455,867 8.72
Netherlands 834 833,519 4.99
Sweden 536 536,001 3.21
Belgium 514 513,790 3.08
Austria 416 416,365 2.49
Denmark 334 333,744 2.00
Greece 290 290,153 1.74
Finland 263 262,620 1.57
Portugal 238 238,106 1.43
Ireland 226 226,242 1.36
Czech Republic 216 216,061 1.29
Slovak Republic 96 95,971 0.57
Luxembourg 58 58,063 0.35
Slovenia 50 50,299 0.30
Latvia 28 28,480 0.17
Cyprus 25 25,017 0.15
Estonia 23 22,564 0.14
Malta 9 9,314 0.06
16,691 16,691,361 100.00
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database,
April 2014.
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promote national social policy in times of global eco-
nomic integration.
Summary
The interaction between taxation, social policy, and eco-
nomic growth is not an exact science. Nonetheless, efforts
are being made to examine how global economic integra-
tion affects the space for national social policy. Most often,
however, these do not include models or scenarios consider-
ing the option of an international social protection regime.
In 1994, de Swaan considered “a transnational social
system in which rich countries collectively pay for bene-
fits to poor people in poor countries” and argued “the
question of its feasibility and efficacy merits serious dis-
cussion among students of social policy which, to my
knowledge, it has so far not received” [31]. But de Swaan
was skeptical himself, commenting that “[t]he rich wereready to shoulder the care for the poor only if they be-
lieved they could pacify those who might otherwise con-
stitute a threat to them or if the continued presence of
the poor in their midst held some opportunities for
them” [31]. In the 21st Century, ‘in their midst’ should
no longer be considered in geographical terms but in
economic terms: if the common people of the wealthier
countries want the benefits of global economic integra-
tion without losing the benefits of social policy, they will
have to support social integration beyond borders.
Although we believe that ethical arguments alone
should be sufficient to consider a global social protection
regime, what we propose here, for debate, is the hypoth-
esis that global social integration would both support so-
cial policy in low income countries, and may help avoid
the gradual erosion of social protection in high income
countries. The additional cost for high income countries
would, in most cases, be limited to their contributions to
international transfers as most already expend domestic-
ally the minimum required under this proposal.
Finally, we can anticipate the critique that a global social
protection regime for health alone will not produce the ben-
efits in terms of mitigating a race to the bottom or promot-
ing convergence towards the top. While we agree that a
global social protection regime will only reveal its fullest glo-
bal public good potential if it aims for a comprehensive pack-
age of social protection, we believe that in the area of health,
some progress has been made that does not (yet) have its
equivalent in other areas of social protection, like unemploy-
ment allowances, child benefits or retirement pensions.
Given the orders of magnitude of government revenue
at stake due to global economic integration, we conclude
that the global equalization scheme for UHC proposed
by the SDSN should not be examined as a new form of
foreign aid, but rather as an international collective ef-
fort to protect and promote national social policy in
times of global economic integration.
Endnote
aWHO data on ‘general government expenditure on
health’ include mandatory social protection contribu-
tions. It is not entirely clear if SDSN includes these con-
tributions as well, when it proposes that all states
allocate the equivalent of 5% of national GDP as public
financing for health, but we think it does: when it dis-
cusses financing in these words: “This has been attrib-
uted to the compulsory nature of general taxation and
other government revenue sources (e.g. royalties on the
exploitation of natural resources) and social health in-
surance contributions” [10]. We therefore used WHO
data on ‘general government expenditure on health’ to
assess how far states are removed from the SDSN target
for domestic public financing, after excluding external
resources proportionally.
Table 4 Distribution of equalization transfers ACP-EU (data for 2011)
Country Present per capita
government expenditure
on health at average
exchange rate (US$)
General government
expenditure on health
as a percentage of GDP
after reduction of
external resources
Minimum domestic
general government
expenditure on health
as a percentage of GDP,
SDSN proposal
Minimum domestic per
capita government
expenditure on health,
SDSN proposal, at average
exchange rate (US$)
Gap between minimum
domestic per capita
expenditure and US$50
Population
(in thousands)
total
Equalization transfers
required
Ethiopia 9.59 1.49 3.25 11.60 38.40 89,393 3,432,607.30
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
6.66 1.98 3.49 8.06 41.94 63,932 2,681,623.16
United
Republic of
Tanzania
14.75 1.69 3.35 17.15 32.85 46,355 1,522,774.09
Uganda 11.15 1.81 3.41 15.29 34.71 35,148 1,220,106.96
Kenya 14.34 1.09 3.04 24.57 25.43 42,028 1,068,817.14
Mozambique 14.70 0.83 2.92 15.59 34.41 24,581 845,942.64
Madagascar 11.98 2.11 3.56 16.59 33.41 21,679 724,192.08
Niger 11.09 2.11 3.56 13.44 36.56 16,511 603,617.11
Malawi 22.71 2.93 3.96 14.63 35.37 15,458 546,776.51
Burkina Faso 18.70 1.92 3.46 19.78 30.22 15,995 483,347.38
Mali 20.25 2.29 3.64 23.85 26.15 14,417 376,939.64
Burundi 7.63 1.51 3.26 8.72 41.28 9,540 393,793.12
Guinea 8.13 1.43 3.21 16.03 33.97 11,162 379,143.54
Sudan 29.40 2.27 3.64 44.89 5.11 36,431 186,159.98
Chad 9.55 0.99 2.99 24.62 25.38 12,080 306,539.02
Rwanda 35.58 3.28 4.14 24.13 25.87 11,144 288,288.31
Côte d’Ivoire 21.14 1.60 3.30 38.68 11.32 19,390 219,502.49
Haiti 25.20 2.45 3.72 27.01 22.99 10,033 230,643.39
Benin 19.55 1.59 3.30 26.47 23.53 9,780 230,112.07
Cameroon 21.23 1.56 3.28 42.78 7.22 21,156 152,769.98
Sierra Leone 12.34 2.72 3.86 14.04 35.96 5,865 210,906.21
Eritrea 6.78 0.39 2.69 14.62 35.38 5,933 209,889.77
Togo 23.45 3.46 4.23 23.70 26.30 6,472 170,214.69
Liberia 17.34 2.62 3.81 10.74 39.26 4,080 160,182.19
Central
African
Republic
9.49 1.27 3.14 15.12 34.88 4,436 154,743.50
Senegal 39.05 3.00 4.00 44.78 5.22 13,331 69,521.99
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Table 4 Distribution of equalization transfers ACP-EU (data for 2011) (Continued)
Gambia 14.82 1.25 3.12 19.52 30.48 1,735 52,891.39
Guinea-
Bissau
9.97 0.92 2.96 17.53 32.47 1,624 52,734.17
Mauritania 34.95 3.01 4.00 42.87 7.13 3,703 26,405.14
Comoros 24.60 1.81 3.40 27.53 22.47 700 15,727.96
17,016,912.94
Source: World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory data repository (consulted April 2014), SDSN proposal.
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